We present a variation of the modular algorithm for computing the Hermite Normal Form of an OK -module presented by Cohen [2], where OK is the ring of integers of a number field K. The modular strategy was conjectured to run in polynomial time by Cohen, but so far, no such proof was available in the literature. In this paper, we provide a new method to prevent the coefficient explosion and we rigorously assess its complexity with respect to the size of the input and the invariants of the field K.
INTRODUCTION
The construction of a good basis of an OK-module, where K is a number field and OK its ring of integers, has recently received a growing interest from the cryptographic community. Indeed, OK -modules occur in lattice-based cryptography [8, 9, 10, 13, 14] , where cryptosystems rely on the difficulty to find a short element of a module, or solving the closest vector problem. The computation of a good basis is crucial for solving these problems, and most of the algorithms for computing a reduced basis of a Z-lattice have an equivalent for OK -modules. However, applying the available tools over Z to OK-modules would result in the loss of of their structure.
The computation of a Hermite Normal Form (HNF)-basis was generalized to OK-modules by Cohen [2, Chap. 1] . His algorithm returns a basis that enjoys similar properties as the HNF of a Z-module. A modular version of this algorithm is conjectured to run in polynomial time, although this statement is not proven (see last remark of [2, 1.6.1] ). In addition, Fieker and Stehlé's recent algorithm for computing a sized-reduced basis relies on the conjectured possibility to compute an HNF-basis for an OK -module in polynomial time [5, Th. 1] . This allows a polynomial time equivalent of the LLL algorithm preserving the structure of OK -module. In this paper, we adress the problem of the polynomiality of the computation of an HNF basis for an OK-module by presenting a modified version of Cohen's algorithm [2, Chap. 1]. We thus assure the validity of the LLL algorithm for OKmodules of Fieker and Stehlé [5] which has applications in lattice-based cryptography, as well as in representations of matrix groups [4] and in automorphism algebras of Abelian varieties. In addition, our HNF algorithm allows to compute a basis for the intersection of OK modules, which has applications in list decoding codes based on number fields (see [6] for their description).
Our contribution. We present in this paper the first polynomial time algorithm for computing an HNF basis of an OK -module based on the modular approach of Cohen [2, Chap. 1] . We rigorously adress its correctness and derive bounds on its run time with respect to the size of the input, the dimension of the module and the invariants of the field.
GENERALITIES ON NUMBER FIELDS
Let K be a number field of degree d. It has r1 ≤ d real embeddings (σi) i≤r 1 and 2r2 complex embeddings (σi) r 1 <i≤2r 2 (coming as r2 pairs of conjugates). The field K is isomorphic to OK ⊗ Q where OK denotes the ring of integers of K. We can embed K in
and extend the σi's to K R . Let T2 be the Hermitian form on K R defined by
and let x := T2(x, x) be the corresponding L2-norm. Let (αi) i≤d such that OK = ⊕iZαi, then the discriminant of K is given by ∆K = det 2 (T2(αi, αj )). The norm of an element x ∈ K is defined by N (x) = i |σi(x)|.
To represent OK-modules, we rely on a generalization of the notion of ideal, namely the fractional ideals of OK . They can be defined as finitely generated Z-modules of K. When a fractional ideal is contained in OK , we refer to it as an integral ideal, which is in fact an ideal of OK . Otherwise, for every fractional ideal I of OK, there exists r ∈ Z>0 such that rI is integral. The sum and product of two fractional ideals of OK is given by
The fractional ideals of OK are invertible, that is for every fractional ideal I, there exists I −1 := {x ∈ K | xI ⊆ OK } such that II −1 = OK. The set of fractional ideals is equipped with a norm function defined by N (I) = det(M I )/ det(OK ) where the rows of M I are a Z-basis of I. The norm of ideals is multiplicative, and in the case of an integral ideal, we have N (I) = |OK /I|. Also note that the norm of x ∈ K is precisely the norm of the principal ideal (x) = xOK. Algorithms for ideal arithmetic in polynomial time are described in Section 5.
THE HNF
Let M ⊆ K l be a finitely generated OK-module. As in [2, Chap. 1], we say that [(ai), (ai)] i≤n , where ai ∈ K and ai is a fractional ideal, is a pseudo-basis for M if
Note that a pseudo-basis is not unique, and the main result of [5] is precisely to compute a pseudo-basis of short elements. If the sum is not direct, we call [(ai), (ai)] i≤n a pseudo-generating set for M . Once a pseudo-generating set [(ai), (ai)] i≤n for M is known, we can associate a pseudomatrix A = (A, I) to M , where A ∈ K n×l and I = (ai) i≤n is a list of n fractional ideals such that
where Ai ∈ K l is the i-th row of A. We can construct a pseudo-basis from a pseudo-generating set by using the Hermite normal form (HNF) over Dedekind domains (see [2, Th. 1.4.6] ). Note that this canonical form is also refered to as the pseudo-HNF in [2, 1.4] . In this paper we simply call it HNF, but we implicitly refer to the standard HNF over Z when dealing with an integer matrix. Assume A is of rank l (in particular n ≥ l), then there exists an n×n matrix U = (ui,j ) and n non-zero ideals b1, · · · , bn satisfying
The matrix U A is of the form
In general, the algorithm of [2] for computing the HNF of a pseudo-matrix takes exponential time, but as in the integer case, there exists a modular one which is polynomial in the dimensions of A, the degree of K, and the bit size of the modulus. Note that in the case of a pseudo matrix representing an OK -module M , the modulus is an integral multiple of the determinantal ideal g(M ), which is generated by all the ideals of the form
where deti 1 ,··· ,i l (A) is the determinant of the l×l minor consisting of the last l columns of rows of indices i1, · · · , i l . The determinantal ideal is a rather involved structure, except in the case l = n. In applications, the modulus is frequently known. In the rest of the paper, we restrict ourselves to the case of an n × n matrix A of rank n. One can immediatly derive polynonmial time algorithms for the rectangular case, and for the case of a singular matrix A.
NOTION OF SIZE
To ensure that our algorithm for computing an HNF basis of an OK -module runs in polynomial time, we need a notion of size that bounds the bit size required to represent ideals and field elements. An ideal I ⊆ OK is given by the matrix M I ∈ Z d×d of its basis expressed in an integral basis ω1, · · · , ω d of OK . If the matrix is in Hermite Normal Form, the size required to store it is therefore bounded by d 2 maxi,j log(|M If a = (1/k)I is a fractional ideal of K, where I ⊆ OK and k ∈ Z>0 is minimal, then the natural generalization of the notion of size is
where log(k) is the base 2 logarithm of k. We also define the size of elements of K. If x ∈ OK can be written as x = i≤d xiωi, where xi ∈ Z, then we define its size by
It can be generalized to elements y ∈ K by writing y = x/k where x ∈ OK and k is a minimal positive integer, and by setting S(y) := log(k) + S(x).
In the litterature, the size of elements of K is often expressed with x . These two notions are in fact related.
Proposition 1. Let x ∈ OK , the size of x and its T2-norm satisfy
Proof. In appendix So, for all x ∈ OK , S(x) = O (log ( x )), and log ( x ) = O(S(x)), where the constants are polynomial in d and log |∆K |.
Corollary 1. Let x, y ∈ OK , their size satisfies
COST MODEL
We assume that the module M satifies M ⊆ O n K and that OK is given by an LLL-reduced integral basis ω1, · · · , ω d such that ω1 = 1. The computation of such a basis can be done by using [1, Cor. 3] to produce a good integral basis for OK and then reducing it with the LLL algorithm [7] . In this section, we evaluate the complexity of the basic operations performed during our algorithm. We rely on standard number theoretic algorithms. We multiply two integers of bit size h in time M(h) ≤ O (h log(h) log(log(h))) using Schönhage-Strassen algorithm, while the addition of such integers is in O(h), their division has complexity bounded by O(M(h)), and the Euclidiean algorihm that provides their GCD has complexity O(log(h)M(h)) (see [11] ). In the following, we also refer to two standard linear algebra algorithms, namely the HNF computation over the integers due to Storjohann [15] in complexity nmr ω−1 log |A| 1+o(1) and Dixon's p-adic algorithm for solving linear systems in
where A ∈ Z m×n has rank r and has its entries bounded by |A|, and where 3 ≥ ω ≥ 2 is the exponent of the complexity of matrix multiplication. We need to perform additions, multiplications and inversions of elements of K, as well as of fractional ideals. There is no reference on the complexity of these operations, although many implementations can be found. We adress this problem in the rest of this section. We useÕ to denote the complexity were all the logarithmic factors are omitted. Elements x of K are represented as quotients of an element of OK and a positive denominator. We add them naively while their multiplication is done by using a precomputed table of the ωiωj for i, j ≤ d.
then the following holds:
Proof. Adding α and β is straightforward. Multiplying them is done by storing a precomputed multiplication table for the ωiωj. Finally, inverting α boils down to solving a linear system in the coefficients of 
Proof. Note that the reason why the dependency in B in the complexity of the addition of fractional ideals is slightly more than in the complexity of the multiplication is the way we deal with the denominators. In the case of integral ideals, the addition would be inÕ(d ω−1 B). The last operation that needs to be performed during our HNF algorithm is the multiplication between an element of K and a fractional ideal.
Proof. If γ1, · · · , γ d is an integral basis for a ⊆ OK, then (αγi) i≤d is one for (α)a. The HNF of the matrix representing these elements leads to the desired result. More details are given in appendix.
THE NORMALIZATION
The normalization is the key difference between our approach and the one of Cohen [2, 1.5] . It is the strategy that prevents the coefficient swell by calculating a pseudobasis for which the ideals are integral with size bounded by the field's invariants. Given a one-dimensional OK -module aA ⊆ O n K where a is a fractional ideal of K, and A ∈ K n , we find b ∈ K such that the size taken to represent our module as (ba)(A/b) is reasonably bounded. Indeed, any non trivial module can be represented by elements of arbitrary large size, which would cause a significant slow-down in our algorithm.
The first step to our normalization is to make sure that a is integral. This allows us to bound the denominator of the coefficients of the matrix when manipulating its rows during the HNF algorithm. If k ∈ Z is the denominator of a, then replacing a by ka and A by A/k increases the size needed to represent our module via the growth of all the denominators of the coefficients of A ∈ K n . Thus, after this operation, the size of each coefficient ai of A is bounded by S(ai) + S(a).
We can now assume that our one-dimensional module is of the form aA where a ⊆ OK and A ∈ K n at the price of a slight growth of its size. The next step of normalization is to express our module as a ′ A ′ where A ′ ∈ K n and a ′ ⊆ OK such that N (a ′ ) only depends on invariants of the field. To do this, we invert a and write it as
where k ∈ Z>0 and b ⊆ OK . As N (a) ∈ a, we have N (a)a −1 ⊆ OK and thus k ≤ N (a). Therefore,
Then we use the LLL algorithm to find an element α ∈ b such that
Our reduced ideal is
The integrality of a ′ comes from the definition of b −1 and the fact that α ∈ b. From the arithmetic-geometric mean, we know that
and the norm of the reduced ideal can be bounded by
|∆K |. On the other hand, we set A ′ := (k/α)A, which induces a growth of the coefficients ai of A. Indeed, each ai is multiplied by (k/α).
Proposition 5. The size of the normalized module
Proof. From Corollary 1 we know that
In addition, if
On the one hand, we have
and on the other hand, we need to bound x . We notice that since N (α) ∈ Q, ∀j ≤ d, N (α) = αβ = σj (αβ). We also know that ∀j, |σj (α)| ≤ α . Therefore,
, and thus
Our normalization, summarized in Algorithm 1, was performed at the price of a reasonable growth in the size of the object we manipulate. Let us now evaluate its complexity. 
Algorithm 1 Normalization of a one-dimensional module
Input: A ∈ K n , fractional ideal a of K. Output: A ′ ∈ K n , a ′ ⊆ OK such that N (a ′ ) ≤ 2 d 2 /2 |∆K | and aA = a ′ A ′ . 1: a ← k0a, A ← A/k0where k0 is the denominator of a. 2: b ← ka −1 where k is the denominator of a −1 . 3: Let α be
4:
a ′ ← α k a, A ′ ← k α A. 5: return a ′ , A ′ .
Proposition 6. Let B1, B2 such that S(a) ≤ B1 and ∀i, S(ai) ≤ B2, then the complexity of Algorithm 1 is bounded byÕ
Proof. The inversion of a is performed in timẽ
by using Proposition 3. Then, the LLL-reduction of the basis of b is done by the L 2 algorithm of Stehlé and Nguyen [12] in expected time bounded bỹ
Then, computing (α/k)a is the multiplication of the ideal a by the element α/k which satisfies
and performing n + 1 multiplications between elements of size bounded byÕ(d 3 + B1 + B2 + d log |∆K |), which is done in timeÕ
The result follows from the combination of the above expected times and from the fact that 2 ≤ ω ≤ 3.
REDUCTION MODULO A FRACTIONAL IDEAL
To achieve a polynomial complexity for our HNF algorithm, we reduce some elements of K modulo ideals whose norm can be reasonably bounded. We show in this section how to bound the norm of a reduced element with respect to the norm of the ideal and invariants of K. Let a be a fractional ideal of K, and x ∈ K. Our goal is to find x ∈ K such that x is bounded, and that x − x ∈ a.
The reduction algorithm consists of finding an LLL-reduced basis r1, · · · , r d of a and to decompose
Then, we define
Proposition 7. Let x ∈ K and a be a fractional ideal of K, then Algorithm 2 returns x such that x − x ∈ a and
Proof. In appendix
Algorithm 2 Reduction modulo a fractional ideal
return α.
3: else 4:
Compute an LLL-reduced basis (ri) i≤d of a.
5:
Decompose α = i≤d xiri. 6:
8: end if Proposition 8. Let B1, B2 such that S(a) ≤ B1 and S(α) ≤ B2, then the complexity of Algorithm 2 is bounded byÕ
Proof. To compute the LLL-reduced basis of a, we LLLreduce the integral ideal ka where k ∈ Z>0 is the denominator of a. Then, we express x with respect to the basis of ka where x ∈ OK satifies α = x/a for a ∈ Z>0. Then we divide by the respective denominator at the extra cost of d multiplications.
Using the L 2 algorithm of Stehlé and Nguyen [12] yields the reduced basis of ka in expected time bounded bỹ
Then, expressing x with respect to the reduced basis of ka costsÕ
Finally, the subtraction and the division by the denominators are inÕ After the original normalization, all the ideals are integral. As M ⊆ O n K , we immediatly deduce that the ideal d created at Step 6 of Algorithm 3 is integral as well. In addition, from the definition of the inverse of an ideal we also have that bi,ibibi,j bj bi,j bj + bi,ibi ⊆ OK , which allows us to conclude that the update of (bi, bj ) performed at Step 9 of Algorithm 3 preserves the fact that our ideals are integral.
MODULAR HNF ALGORITHM
Algorithm 3 HNF of a full-rank square pseudo-matrix modulo g
Find u ∈ bid −1 and v ∈ bj d −1 such that bi,j u + bj,j v = 1 with [2, Th. 1.3.3]. 8:
Normalize bi, Bi with Algorithm 1.
11:
Reduce Bi modulo gb
and Bj modulo gb −1 j with Algorithm 2. 12:
end while 14:
j ← j − 1. 15: end while 16: return (bi) i≤n , B.
The normalization and reduction at Step 10-11 allow us to keep the size of the Bi and of the bi reasonably bounded by invariants of K and the dimension of the module. By doing so, we give away some information about the module M .
However, algorithm 4 allows us to recover M , as we state in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. The OK-module defined by the pseudobasis [(Wi), (ci)] obtained by applying Algorithm 4 to the HNF of M modulo g(M ) satisfies
Proof. The proof of this statement essentially follows its equivalent for matrices over the integers. It consists of showing that W := i ci and M := i aiAi have the same determinantal ideal and that W ⊆ A, and then showing that this implies that W = M . A more complete proof is given in appendix.
Algorithm 4 Eucledian reconstruction of the HNF
Find u ∈ bj d −1 and v ∈ gc
j ← j − 1. 8: end while 9: return W, (ci) i≤n .
COMPLEXITY OF THE MODULAR HNF
Let us assume that we are able to compute the determinantal ideal g of our module M in polynomial time with respect to the bit size of the invariants of the field and of S(g). We discuss the computation of g in Section 10. In this section, we show that Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 are polynomial wih respect to the same parameters. This result is analogous to the case of integers matrices. Indeed, the only thing we need to verify is that the size of the elements remains reasonably bounded during the algorithm.
In Algorithm 3, the coefficient explosion is prevented by the modular reduction of Step 11. It ensures that
This is not enough to prevent the explosion since bi 1 ,i 2 might not be integral. Therefore, there is a minimal k ∈ Z>0 such that kbi 1 ,i 2 ∈ OK , which we need to bound to ensure that S(bi 1 ,i 2 ) remains bounded as well. We know that bi,j bi ⊆ OK , and that bi is integral. Thus, N (k) | N (bi 1 ), which in turns implies that k ≤ N (bi 1 ). As on the other hand, the normalization of Step 10 ensures that N (bi 1 ) ≤ 2
|∆K |, we conclude that after Step 11,
In Algorithm 3, we last manipulate Bj and bj when the index j is the pivot. In that case, we cannot use the normalization to bound the size since we require that bj,j = 1. However we reduce Bj modulo gbj , which means that
In addition, the arithmetic-geometric tells us that bj,j ≥ √ dN (bi,j) 1/d , which in turn implies that
As we know that
we therefore know that after Step 9
which allows us to bound the size of the denominators in the j-th row the same way we did for the rows of index i1 < j:
Proposition 10. The complexity of Algorithm 3 is iñ
Proof. Steps 6 to 11 of Algorithm 3 are repeated O(n 2 ) times. Let us analyze their complexity. First, at Step 6 we have
so from Proposition 4, computing bi,jbi takes
Then, from Proposition 3 and (1),
As
From [3, 4.8.4] , this is done by solving a linear system on a matrix D satisfying
and the coefficients of the HNF matrix of d are those of a matrix M satisfying log | det(M )| ≤Õ d 2 log |D| . Therefore, we have
As S(bi), S(bj ) ≤Õ(d 3 + log |∆K |), computing bid −1 and bj d −1 takesÕ (N (Ij) ). This cost is inÕ
In addition, S(u
Then, by using the same methdods as in the proof of Proposition 5, we know that S
while Proposition 2 ensures us that inverting bi,j is done iñ
Then, calculating u ′ /bi,j and v ′ /bj,j is done in time bounded byÕ
and by Corollary 1, we know that
Then, from Proposition 2 and (2), the expected time for
Step 8 is bounded bỹ
In addition, after Step 8, we have
Then, from Proposition 3 and the bounds on S(bi,jbi) and
Step 9 takes
By using Proposition 6, we bound the time taken by Step 10 byÕ
Finally, from the bound on S(bi,j ) after Step 8 and Proposition 8, Step 11 takes
The Euclidian reconstruction of Algorithm 4 can be seen as another pivot operation between the two one-dimensional OK -modules bj Bj and gj ej for each j ≤ n. We can therefore bound the entries of W by the same method as for Step 6-11 of Algorithm 3, we the extra observation
Therefore, we showed that we could bound the size of the objects that are manipulated throughout the algorithm by values that are polynomial in terms of n, d, S(g) and log(|∆K |), and that the complexity of the HNF algorithm was polynomial in these parameters.
COMPUTING THE MODULUS
Let us assume that A ∈ O n×n K . If it is not the case, then we need to multiply by the common denominator k of the entries of A and return det(kA)/k n . In this section, we describe how to compute g in polynomial time with respect to n, d, log |∆K | and the size of the entries of A. The idea is to compute det(A) mod (p) for a sufficiently large prime number p. In practice, one might prefer to compute det(A) mod (pi) for several prime numbers p1, · · · , p l and recombine the values via the chinese remainder theorem, but for the sake of simplicity, we only describe that procedure for a single prime. Once det(A) is computed in polynomial time, we return
The first step consists of evaluating how large p should be to ensure that we recover det(A) uniquely. As pω1, · · · , pω d is an integral basis for (p), it suffices that p ≥ maxi |ai| where det(A) = i aiωi. As maxi |ai| ≤ 2 3d/2 det(A) , it suffices to bound det(A) . We first compute an upper bound on |σ(det(A))| for the d complex embeddings σ of K via Hadamard's inequality and then we deduce a bound on det(A) . Let σ : K → C, we know from Hadamard's inequality that
where B is a bound on σ(ai,j). Such a bound can be derived from the size of the coefficient of A by using
This way, we see that B := 2
|∆K | suffices. Then, our bound on det(A) is simply
|∆K |.
Algorithm 5 Computation of det(A)
Input:
Compute det(A) mod pi. 4: end for 5: Recover det(A) mod (p) via successive applications of Algorithm 6 6: return det(A).
To reconstruct det(A) mod (p) from det(A) mod ai for i ≤ d, let us consider the simpler case of the reconstruction modulo two coprime ideals a, b of OK. Let Ma and M b be the matrices representing the Z basis of a and b in the integral basis (ωi) i≤d of OK , and let x, y, w ∈ OK such that x = y mod a x = w mod b.
We wish to compute z ∈ OK such that x = z mod ab. . Then, a solution to our CRT recomposition is given by z := wa + yb.
Algorithm 6 CRT recomposition Input: a, b ⊆ OK , x, y, w ∈ OK such that x = y mod a and x = w mod b. Output: z ∈ OK such that x = z mod ab.
1: Compute a ∈ a, b ∈ b such that a + b = 1. 2: return z.
Proposition 11. Let B > maxi,j (S(ai,j)), then the complexity of Algorithm 5 is bounded bỹ
Proof. For each pi, the computation of det(A) mod pi consists of n 3 multiplications of reduced elements modulo pi followed by a reduction modulo pi. Given our choice of p, we have log N (pi) ≤Õ d(B + d 2 + log |∆K |) .
Therefore, the size of the elements x ∈ OK involved in these multiplications satisfies
The cost of the multiplications is iñ 
CONCLUSION
We described a polynomial time algorithm for computing the HNF basis of an OK -module. Our strategy relies on the one of Cohen [2, 1.4] who had conjectured that his modular algorithm was polynomial. The crucial difference between our algorithm and the one of [2, 1.4 ] is the normalization which allows us to prove the complexity to be polynomial. Without it, we cannot bound the denominator of the coefficients of the matrix when we recombine rows, even if they are reduced modulo the determinantal ideal. We provided a rigorous proof of the complexity of our method with respect to the dimension of the module, the size of the input and the invariants of the field. Our algorithm is the first polynomial time method for computing the HNF of an OK -module. This result is significant since other applications rely on the possibility of computing the HNF of an OK -module in polynomial time. In particular, Fieker and Stehlé [5] made this assumption in the analysis of their LLL algorithms for OKmodules. Our result has natural ramifications in cryptography through the LLL algorithm of Fieker and Stehlé [5] , but it can also be used for list-decoding number field codes.
